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Further Reflections on the Guillotine
Ronald Jay Allen and Amy Shavell
Abstract
The authors criticize the tone and substance of the current death penalty debate.
The authors demonstrate that, as uncomfortable as it may sound, death is the com-
monality of social planning, and that all social policy decisions, including whether
to have capital punishment, determine who will live and who will die. That we
may execute some innocent people is an important consideration, but in light of
the fact that without the death penalty other innocent people will be killed, it is not
necessarily a reason to abandon it. If capital punishment deters crime, the point is
obvious, but because the guilty will sometimes kill again if not executed, abolition
would not obviously save innocent lives instead of merely displacing death. And
just like any other form of social planning, the authors argue, such an allocation
of death is the rightful province of a democratic society.
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FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON THE 
GUILLOTINE 
RONALD J. ALLEN*   &  AMY SHAVELL** 
 
Perhaps the most moving polemic against the death penalty is Albert 
Camus’ Reflections on the Guillotine.  Camus’ sharp opposition to the death 
penalty may have derived from the force of the one story that he repeatedly 
heard about his father, who had died before Camus was one year old:1 
Shortly before the war of 1914, an assassin whose crime was 
particularly repulsive (he had slaughtered a family of farmers, 
including the children) was condemned to death in Algiers.  He was a 
farm worker who had killed in a sort of bloodthirsty frenzy but has 
aggravated his case by robbing his victims.  The affair created a great 
stir.  It was generally thought that decapitation too mild a punishment 
for such a monster.  This was the opinion, I have been told, of my 
father, who was especially aroused by the murder of the children.  One 
of the few things I know about him, in any case, is that he wanted to 
witness the execution, for the first time in his life.  He got up in the 
dark to go to the place of execution at the other end of town amid a 
great crowd of people.  What he saw that morning he never told 
anyone.  My mother relates merely that he came rushing home, his 
face distorted, refused to talk, lay down for a moment on the bed, and 
suddenly began to vomit.  He had just discovered the reality hidden 
under the noble phrases with which it was masked.  Instead of thinking 
of the slaughtered children, he could think of nothing but that 
quivering body that had just been dropped onto a board to have its 
head cut off.2 
                                                                 
* John Henry Wigmore Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. 
** J.D. Northwestern University School of Law, expected May 2005.  A.B., Harvard 
College, 1998.  An earlier version of this paper was submitted by Ms. Shavell in partial 
fulfillment of the Senior Research Program of Northwestern University School of Law. 
1 HERBERT R. LOTTMAN, ALBERT CAMUS: A BIOGRAPHY  23 (1979). 
2 Albert Camus, Reflections on the Guillotine, in RESISTANCE , REBELLION, AND DEATH 
175 (Justin O’Brien trans., 1961). 
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My3 emotional response to the death penalty came about under quite 
different circumstances, and unlike Camus, left me agnostic about the death 
penalty. The main work that I did in the early years of my career centered 
on formal aspects of the process of proof, including the constitutional 
interest in proof beyond reasonable doubt.  It so happened that derivatives 
of these questions were present in every capital case tried during that time, 
and thus I was consulted by both sides in the legal battles, and began taking 
some pro bono cases.  In representation of this sort, engagement with the 
record is critical, but as I dug into the records in some of the cases I was 
repelled by what I found my clients had done.  Truth is both stranger and 
crueler than fiction, and reading about some of my clients’ inhuman acts 
left me unclear as to what it meant to be human, and thinking that execution 
of these individuals might be no different from putting a mad dog to sleep 
or cutting out a cancer.  At the same time, I found that another incompatible 
notion exerted an influence on me, even though it seemed strange and 
almost mystical.  Consciousness brings light into a cold and dark universe, 
and every speck of it, even in these cold-hearted killers, is the product of an 
infinite evolution that ought not to be extinguished lightly. These two views 
left me in equipoise, like the proverbial donkey dying of thirst because it 
was exactly halfway between two wells and found itself unable to decide 
which one to turn to.  I resolved the conflict through agnosticism but one 
which demanded that the government take appropriate care prior to 
executing someone; and I was willing to be part of the process of trying to 
hold the government’s feet to the fire through legal representation of capital 
defendants. 
Over the years my agnosticism matured from an irresolvable 
emotional conflict to a rational conclusion.  Like the opposition of equal but 
opposite emotional forces, the consequentialist arguments for and against 
the death penalty are likewise in equipoise, in our 4 opinion, although one 
would not know it by hanging around either law schools generally or 
conferences such as the one that precipitated this article particularly.  
Conferences on the death penalty in American law schools typically are 
self-righteous displays of commitment to revealed truth, the truth being that 
opposition to death penalty goes without saying and the only issue is how 
strongly its proponents can be tarnished with either their illogic or moral 
depravity.  Indeed, the opposition (i.e., the proponents of the death penalty) 
are typically represented, if at all, by someone who is supposed to utter 
                                                                 
3 Ms. Shavell is a full co-author of this article, but the article was motivated by Allen’s 
experience, the story we are about to tell in the text. 
4 Note the shift from the minor to the major key, within which we shall stay the 
remainder of the essay. 
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barely comprehensible rantings about victims and deterrence, but the real 
point of the display is to demonstrate the horrifying moral shortcomings of 
one who wishes deliberately to take another’s life. 
Obviously, we do not possess a commitment to this part of the 
received view of the American law school professoriate, although nor do 
we adhere to its opposition. Our view is that whether to have capital 
punishment is an enormously difficult and complex problem with no a 
priori correct solution.  That in turn means that the type of arguments often 
heard at academic gatherings that are presented as serious indictments of 
capital punishment we do not believe to be very convincing, although 
neither are their obverses. Given the typical imbalance at conferences like 
this, we intend to examine the limitations of the abolit ionist arguments. 
First, a clarification.  Two types of arguments bear on the death 
penalty debate, as they do on most debates, normative and consequential.  
We put normative arguments aside, not out of disrespect but primarily 
because we do not think an essay can alter them—we share Judge Posner’s 
skepticism that moral arguments greatly influence adult beliefs or actions; 
they may instead simply reflect individual life experiences.  
Consequentialist arguments, by contrast, influence everybody all the time, 
and it is here where views may be affected.  Our topic, though, will not be 
precisely what is implied by the title of this symposium, but it will soon 
become obvious how it relates.  While our concern is not so much 
Innocence in Capital Sentencing, it is very definitely related to Innocence 
and Capital Sentencing, as innocence plainly bears on the question of the 
propriety of capital sentencing.  However, its bearing on that question is 
more complex than it appears at first glance. 
There are obviously plausible arguments against the death penalty.  
First, of course, and the primary focus of this conference, is the risk of 
error.  The bête noir of those favoring capital punishment is the execution 
of an innocent person.  In Illinois, there is a related parochial problem, 
which is the endemic corruption that infects politics here, which has had its 
grip at various times on all branches of government.  Although apparently 
rampant corruption in the Secretary of State’s and Governor’s offices has 
been most in the public eye in recent years, it bears remembering that not 
long ago widespread corruption was uncovered in the Cook County 
judiciary that involved allegations of both wrongful acquittals for bribes 
and convictions imposed as cover-ups.  Risk of error is bad enough, but 
compounding that risk with the risk of corruption makes the case 
compelling, or so it would seem.  And of course there are other, 
supplemental, arguments, such as the high cost of executions, their 
brutalizing effects on the population, and the risk of discriminatory 
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application.  That these are plausible arguments, we grant; that they are 
compelling we deny. 
Begin with what is by far the most important issue, the risk of error.  
The argument that the risk of executing an innocent person is a sufficient 
justification to eliminate capital punishment is a paradigmatic example of 
the regrettable consequences flowing from debates within the realm of 
criminal justice seeming to occupy their own conceptual space that exists 
without contact with other, related fields of regulation.  Although it seems 
to have escaped the attention of the death penalty debate, a common feature 
of social planning is that it affects the inc idence of death.  Virtually all 
social policies and decisions quite literally determine who will live and who 
will die.  Every year for half a century, between 25,000 and 40,000 people 
have died in vehicular accidents, many of whom are innocent in every sense 
of the word.  The number of deaths on the roads is clearly quite sensitive to 
current regulation; faster speed limits mean more deaths, safety devices on 
cars affect the outcome of crashes, and so on.5  Merely permitting people on 
the roads guarantees a slaughter, and the mere fact of innocent deaths is not 
sufficient to put an end to the slaughter.  But, is that not because of the 
benefits that result?  Maybe so, but that, actually, is our point: explicit 
tradeoffs are made between benefits and costs, including the costs of 
innocent deaths. 
In a universe with finite resources, allocation decisions with real 
consequences must constantly be made, and one of the primary 
consequences invariably is who will live and who will die, if not tomorrow, 
then sometime in the future.  The point is obvious, but let us make it on a 
grand and dramatic scale.  It is not at all obvious that more lives are saved 
by all the tax dollars spent on medical research today as compared to using 
that money to improve the nation’s schools, thereby improving the chances 
of the poorest and most vulnerable of our population. It is obvious, though, 
that the decisions made as to what level of support to give to which 
programs directly affects who lives for how long and who dies. 
                                                                 
5 The number of  innocent lives lost from automobile accidents could be decreased rather 
painlessly and quite dramatically.  According to the Automotive Coalition for Traffic Safety, 
65,000 lives have been saved by safety belts since 1982.  However, an additional 9,000 lives 
could be saved each year if all automobile passengers used safety belts.  Increasing the 
proper use of safety belts is considered the most effective means of saving lives in 
automobile-related deaths.  See Statement by Philip W. Haseltine, President of the American 
Coalition for Traffic Safety (Jun. 12, 1996), available at http://www.actsinc.org/ 
61296_1.cfm.  We could, for example, attach harsh penalties to not wearing safety belts (as 
has Israel) in order to save a considerable number of innocent lives, but few municipalities 
have enacted such legislation. 
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But still, the riposte should be forthcoming, even if government 
engages in contestable cost/benefit analyses, the objectives are laudatory in 
general, and how, the complaint would run, can one say the same of capital 
punishment?  There are two answers to this.  First, it admits that debate 
over capital punishment is a debate over price not principle, and there are 
obvious benefits in the retributive and deterrent consequences of capital 
punishment.  These are conventional points that we will not tarry over 
except to say that the abolitionists seem to neglect with respect to 
retribution that perhaps the most important justification for the criminal law 
is that it legitimizes and civilizes the natural retributive impulse that victims 
feel. 
As for deterrence, the evidence historically has been ambiguous, but 
there has recently been an intriguing series of papers demonstrating a 
deterrent effect.6  If capital punishment has any deterrent effect at all, then 
obviously the choice whether to have it, so far as mistakes are concerned, 
reduces to the standard choice of governmental policy of which innocents 
shall live and which shall die.  Even if some innocents are executed, it 
would take but a small deterrent effect to overwhelm those wrongful deaths 
with the savings of innocent lives—namely, those individuals who are not 
murdered because of the deterrence of the crime of murder.7  This point, of 
                                                                 
6 See, e.g., Joanna M. Shepherd, Murders of Passion, Execution Delays, and the 
Deterrence of Capital Punishment, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (2004) (finding that each 
execution on average deters three murders); see also Hashem Dezhbakhsh et al., Does 
Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel 
Data, 5 AM. L. ECON. REV.  344 (2003) (finding that each execution deters between ten and 
eighteen murders); H. Naci Mocan & R. Kaj Gittings, Getting off Death Row: Commuted 
Sentences and the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 46 J.L. & ECON. 453 (2003) 
(finding that each additional execution results in a reduction of five murders, but that the 
total impact of each removal from death row (other than execution) results in an increase of 
one additional homicide).  These recent studies have been criticized by Richard Berk in his 
article, New Claims About Executions and General Deterrence: Déjà Vu All over Again, J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming).  Berk points to the “dominant” effect that few states 
actively executing individuals have on the results of the entire group observed.  The thrust of 
Berk’s criticism appears to be that the results of the recent studies were driven by the few 
states where a substantial number of executions actually occurred.  But this strikes us as a 
strange criticism based on an implausible causal model that assumes a direct linear 
relationship between executions and deterrence.  A “critical mass” model, which is 
consistent with the Shepherd data, seems to us much more realistic. 
7 We accept the claim that innocent people have been executed.  Estimates of how many 
there are, however, are remarkably low.  Franklin Zimring has calculated that the number of 
people executed based on false convictions during the past three decades is about five.  See 
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPTIAL PUNISHMENT 170 
(2003).  Hugo Bedau, Michael L. Radelet and Constance E. Putnam have identified three 
individuals who they believe were wrongfully convicted and executed.  See Charles S. 
Lanier & James R. Acker, Capital Punishment, the Moratorium Movement, and Empirical 
Questions: Looking Beyond Innocence, Race, and Bad Lawyering in Death Penalty Cases , 
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course, explains why the liberal academy always responds with such fury to 
anyone with the audacity to publish findings showing a deterrent effect, and 
we predict we will see the same phenomenon with respect to the recent 
studies that adduce a significant deterrent effect. 
When the dust settles, we will see where we are.  Still, so far as the 
justification for capital punishment goes, the ambiguity surrounding 
deterrence is no different from the ambiguity about which medical research 
to fund or whether to increase the funding of education at the expense of 
science.8  These decisions, too, affect who lives and dies, and often with 
considerable less support than the deterrence hypothesis about capital 
punishment.   
The argument about innocent lives is even more fundamentally flawed 
than the head in the sand neglect of the nature of regulatory questions.  
Even if there is no deterrent effect of capital punishment, its elimination 
will merely shift the set of innocent victims, just as competing 
governmental regulatory choices invariably do.  Indeed, in a hypothetical 
regime where an execution does not deter any future murders, a decision 
not to execute an individual may nevertheless result in deaths of other 
individuals:  namely an inmate who would have been executed may kill 
others in prison.9  Consider the case of Corey L. Fox, who strangled his 
                                                                                                                                                      
10 PSYCH . PUB. POL. & L. 577, 593 (2004) (citing M ICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF 
INNOCENCE  279 (1992)). Plainly, if these numbers approximate the truth, even a small 
deterrent effect from capital punishment would result in more innocent lives saved than lost 
through mistake. 
8 For example the National Institutes of Health spent approximately $1,069 per person 
afflicted with HIV/AIDS but only $296 per person suffering from cancer in 1996.  There 
were 32,665 deaths from AIDS and $1.4 billion allocated in funding, or $43,206 per death.  
In the same year 544,278 people died from cancer, which garnered $2.57 billion in funding 
or $4,723 per death.  See Nat’l Center for Pol’y Analysis, Idea House: Medical Research, at 
www.ncpa.org/health/pdh39.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2005). 
9 There are numerous inmate murders.  A Lexis-Nexis search of inmate murders since 
1999 yielded over thirty instances.  See, e.g., Arizona Executes Two-Time Inmate Killer , 
WASH . POST, May 6, 1999, at A18 (Arizona inmate “Bonzai Bob” killed two fellow inmates 
while he was on death row awaiting execution.  His cellmate was strangled with a bed sheet 
because he had failed to wake “Bonzai Bob” for lunch.  He killed another inmate for making 
a vulgar comment about his niece by tossing a flaming cup of hair tonic and toilet paper into 
the inmate’s cell, causing him to burn to death.); see also Attica Inmate Killed in Stabbing, 
BUFFALO NEWS, June 11, 2000 at 5B (while waiting for breakfast, inmate stabbed in heart 
with an ice-pick-type weapon); David Chanen, Stillwater Prison Inmate Killed in Work 
Area, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 21, 2000, at 7B (prisoner attacked and killed in 
industrial work area where “parts of the [industrial] shop are had to see because of all the 
equipment”); Lisa L. Colangelo & Corky Seimaszko, Death Row Inmate Killed in Jail Fight, 
DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Sept. 8, 1999 at 8 (death row inmate and cop killer stomped to death by 
another convicted murderer and rapist); Cathy Lynn Grossman, Priest was “Prize” for 
Suspect, USA TODAY, Aug. 26, 2003, at A3 (former priest convicted of child molestation 
strangled to death by fellow inmate serving a life sentence with no parole for murdering a 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art5
    
2005] FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON THE GUILLOTINE 631 
cellmate Joshua Dascewitz because he was “tired of having a cellmate.”10  
Or prison inmate Edward Montour Jr., who, while serving time for killing 
his eleven-week old daughter, beat a guard to death and claimed that he 
would murder again:  “The court knows how little I value human life. . . . It 
is self-evident that I would kill again if another opportunity was afforded 
me.  I am antisocial, homicidal and without remorse and will remain a 
potential threat.  The state can kill me, I don’t care.”11 
We know that some convicted murderers kill again, both after release 
and while in prison.  David Smithers attempted to hire a fellow inmate to 
kill a six-year old girl and her mother for a price of $10,000.12  After release 
from prison, convicted murderer Joseph Fischer killed twenty more 
people.13  According to the Bureau of Justice reports, 6.6% of released 
murderers in 1983 were arrested for murder within three years of their 
release.14  Of the state prisoners released in 1994, 1.2% of the 4,443 persons 
(or 53 individuals) who had served time for homicide were rearrested for 
homicide.15 
The point is that incarceration, the alternative to execution, carries its 
own death risks for the “innocent” and “guilty” alike.  In fact, the chances 
that one will be murdered while in prison are higher than the chances that 
one will be executed.  During the years 1985-1997, a total of 980 people 
were murdered in prison; during this same period 400 people were 
                                                                                                                                                      
gay man); Ed Timms, Inmate Killed, Another Hurt in Prison Violence—Officials Believe 
Polunsky Incident was Gang-related, DALLAS M ORNING NEWS, Mar. 29, 2002, at 31A 
(inmate stabbed eleven times in the abdomen with a metal rod, which had possibly been 
removed from the lip of a cooking tray and made into a weapon). 
10 Convict “Tired” of Cellmate, Killed Him, Official Says , CHI. TRIB., May 13, 2004, § 2, 
at 4. 
11 Mike Patty, Inmate: “Kill Me, I Don’t Care”; Prisoner Who Beat Guard to Death 
Says He Would Murder Again, ROCKY M OUNTAIN NEWS, Feb. 13, 2003, at 32A. 
12 Murder-for-Hire Scheme Described at Hearing; Sentencing Date Set for Molester who 
Tried to Hire Inmate to Kill Victim and Her Mother , INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 16, 2003, at 
15; see also Lisa Sink, Man Asked Inmate to Kill Girlfriend, Police Allege—Detectives Say 
They Recorded Agreement to Pay $1,500, M ILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 17, 1999, at 1 
(twenty-eight-year-old Milwaukee inmate serving time for beating his girlfriend, offered to 
pay another inmate $1,500 to have his girlfriend killed prior to his next court appearance). 
13 See Bonin v, Calderon, 59 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (also 
mentioning Kenneth McDuff, convicted of two murders, released, and who then killed at 
least two and maybe as many as nine more individuals). 
14 ALLEN J. BECK & BERNARD E. SHIPLEY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE , BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983, at 6 tbl.9 (1997), 
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rpr83.pdf. 
15 PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE , BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, at 9 tbl.10 
(2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf. 
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executed.16  In any event, there is a direct trade-off of innocent lives at stake 
that is unaffected by the deterrence hypothesis.  Even if executions increase 
murder rates,17 the critical question would be the relative magnitude of the 
various effects.18 
Nonetheless, is there not something different between executions 
where there is a known risk of error and, say, deaths from car accidents?  
This is often expressed as the difference between knowing you’re killing an 
innocent person and simply the risk one takes  in living in society.  This 
                                                                 
16 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE , CORRECTIONAL 
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1995, at 14 tbl.1.16 (1997) (for statistics from 1985 to 
1989); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE , CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS 
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1997, at 10 tbl.1.20 (2000) (for statistics from 1990 to 1997); Death 
Penalty Information Center, Executions By Year (2005), at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
article.php?scid=8&did=146. 
17 See, e.g., William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Deterrence or Brutalization: What Is 
the Effect of Executions?, 26 CRIME & DELINQUENCY  453, 481 (1980) (finding on average an 
additional two homicides in the month following an execution). 
18 The neglect of false negatives in the standard academic debate is both ubiquitous and 
shocking. There seems to be little concern about guilty individuals going free, and more 
importantly, committing additional crimes, which is surely prevalent.  For example, 
according to an official survey of the seventy-five largest counties in the United States, 42% 
of all violent crime felony cases (which presumptively passed a preliminary innocence 
screening) were dismissed in 1990.  See Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, 
Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the Innocent, 49 RUTGERS L. RE V. 1317, 
1336 (1997).  Direct examples of Camus-like focus on the victims of executions to the 
neglect of their victims include the Broken System  studies cataloguing reversal rates in 
capital cases.  It is simply unclear what to make of the phenomena.  See James Liebman et 
al., A Broken System Part II: Why There Is So Much Error in Capital Cases, and What Can 
Be Done About It (2002), available at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/ 
report.pdf (stating that 68% of all death penalty verdicts were reversed during the years 
1973-1995).  Another example is Professor Samuel R. Gross’s article in this symposium that 
presents data showing that during the years 1989 to 2003 there were 328 exonerations.  See 
Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523 (2005).  Some, and maybe all, of these exonerations may have been 
factually innocent, and thus mistakes (a point that the author does not claim, of course).  
Even if so, again what should be made of that?  That the system is indeed broken, or that it is 
functioning remarkably well?  A conservative estimate of felony convictions during the 
years of Professor Gross’s studies is 13,428,000.  See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, The Number of Adults Convicted of a Felony in State Courts Has Been 
Increasing, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/felconv.htm (last visited March 3, 2005).  
Thus, the Gross data show an error (assuming each exoneration involves an error) rate of 
.0000244265 among felonies.  Just as not all of these exonerations involves innocence, there 
are surely other cases of innocents being convicted lacking exonerations.  What if for every 
case of an exoneration there were a 1,000 cases of wrongful felony convictions?  Then the 
error rate would rise to .00244265, or two to three out of a thousand.  Again, is this a 
“broken” system?  One cannot conclude that on the basis of the errors alone.  Moreover, it is 
not at all obvious that more social investment in lowering such a low error rate would be 
more beneficial than increasing the absolute number of factually accurate convictions. 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art5
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argument fails on both sides of the equation.  First, no one intentionally 
executes an innocent person.  Ex post we may conclude that happened, just 
like ex post we know innocent people die in car accidents.  Second, ex ante, 
it would be considerably easier to avoid the possibility of being wrongful 
convicted of a capital crime than it would to avoid being killed by a car.19  
Pedestrians are killed by cars, after all, and so, too, are innocent people 
sitting in their homes occasionally killed in freakish accidents. 
Admittedly, there seems to be something different in the act of 
execution, where by staying our hand a person lives, but how different can 
it be if the consequence is that someone else dies, even if we cannot 
identify now whom that unfortunate victim of our choice is?  Suppose we 
could.  Suppose we knew in advance who would be saved by executing 
Joseph Fischer.  Would that really matter?  Does the epistemological 
distinction between probability and certainty carry that much weight?  If it 
does, it certainly carries an equal amount of weight with respect to the 
question of institutional design, and it is obvious to the point of banality 
that the choice between a world with or without capital punishment is 
largely a choice between which set of innocents will die.  Some will object 
to this and argue that, no, the choice is over the deliberate execution of 
some, but we deliberately execute the innocent victims by our choice as 
well.  Moreover, decisions as to who will live and die are not foreign to us 
at all; it is the essence of medical triage.  There the argument is that there is 
no choice, as someone will live and someone will die. As we have already 
pointed out, though, by staying the executioner’s hand, someone else will 
die, and so the only distinction here really lies in favoring this person (more 
accurately, this set of persons) over some potentially large set of unknown 
                                                                 
19 There is a tendency to confuse ex ante and ex post relationships.  Consider the 
following example: There are two men awaiting death.  One is a murderer in a cell on death 
row, the other is an AIDS patient lying in a hospital bed waiting for an experimental 
treatment which Congress has voted not to fund.  People tend to think of the execution as 
different from the AIDS patient dying.  They think that the decision to execute is made after 
the man committed the crime, only in order to end his particular life.  Thus people conceive 
of this decision as ex post in nature.  The AIDS patient on his deathbed they conceive 
differently; they think of his death as being the product of a prior legislative decision 
allocating funds to AIDS treatment.  Hence, it is an ex ante  decision, not a decision intended 
specifically to end this patient’s life by denying him further treatment.  But a moment’s 
reflection reveals this distinction to be artificial.  For the decision to execute the criminal is 
really just a byproduct of prior ex ante legislative decisions on criminal punishment.  The 
judge and jury who decide on the death penalty are in principle fulfilling a role decided for 
them by ex ante decisions—in a way analogous to the role that physicians would play in not 
giving treatment to the AIDS patient.  Upon closer consideration, it seems that execution, 
like many other forms of state-sanctioned death, is the result of prior decisions about social 
policy. 
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innocent victims.  Try as one might, we—society—cannot escape from the 
awful truth that death is the commonality of social planning. 20 
The other arguments against capital punishment, being less dramatic, 
have less dramatic limitations.  It is now common place to point out that the 
apparent cost of an execution exceeds by a large margin the cost of 
warehousing a person (two to three million as compared to half a million 
dollars are the typical figures used).21  This simply puts into question how a 
society wishes to spend its money, and for the various reasons suggested 
above, some may believe this a satisfactory choice.  Moreover, given the 
value of life, with ranges varying from one to eighteen million dollars, it 
would be more shocking if the state did not proceed with care, and the cost 
were not high.22 
As for brutality, that is in the eye of the beholder, and its effects are an 
empirical not an analytical question.  The warehousing for life of dangerous 
people is hardly a pleasant sight.  Indeed, to reduce the risk that some of 
these will kill given the slightest opportunity, only virtual solitary 
confinement will suffice.23  Killing a person is a brutal thing; so, too, is 
locking them in an eight by ten cell for thirty years, with virtually no 
contact with any other human for long stretches of time.  But, as we say, the 
real issues here are empirical, yet the debate has adduced no empirical 
evidence of these matters of which we are aware.  This is further evidence 
of the generally unfortunate level at which the debate has occurred. 
Last is the risk of discrimination.  There was certainly a time when 
rampant discrimination against African-Americans occurred.  Those times 
are gone.  One of the most remarkable aspects of the empirical studies of 
the death penalty process done by Baldus and his associates, is just how 
little discrimination was found.  Most of us at the time were convinced that 
                                                                 
20 Some abolitionists may attempt to take refuse in the act/omission distinction, but this  
entails a moral argument about the difference, and thus beyond our interest here.  We will 
note, though, that most reject that there is a moral distinction between killing and letting die, 
although the criminal law makes that distinction in certain contexts out of practicality. 
21 See, e.g., Rudolph J. Gerber, Survival Mechanisms: How American Keeps the Death 
Penalty Alive, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y. REV. 363 (2004); John Paul Truskett, The Death 
Penalty, International Law and Human Rights, 11 TULSA J. COMP . &  INT’L. L. 557 (2004). 
22 Robert W. Hahn, The Economic Analysis of Regulation: A Response to the Critics , 71 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1021 (2004); Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1345 (2003). 
23 However, instances of prison murder, even in lock-down facilities exist.  Sue Fox et 
al., Lapses at Jail Led to Inmate’s Kiling, L.A. TIMES, May 15, 2004, at 1 (inmate killed 
another inmate who was supposed to be given special protection under a judge’s order; 
inmate killer had wandered around the jail for hours); Beth Kassab, Prison Officials Say 
Inmate Killed In Fight, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 24, 2001, at B2 (murdered inmate was 
held in “close custody, one step below the maximum security status reserved for Death Row 
inmates and meaning he was under armed supervision at all times”). 
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robust findings of discrimination would proliferate, and not be essentially 
limited to race of the victim.  Moreover, the effect of the Baldus studies has 
been to point to the solution to this aspect of the discriminatory risk, and 
various states have now implemented proportionality review under the 
guidance of this work.24 
At a more general level, and to return to the risk of error, various 
innovations are occurring throughout the United States with the objective of 
decreasing further the chance of an erroneous execution.  One of the ironies 
of the twenty-first century will be that the work of the abolitionists was 
instrumental to the continued existence of capital punishment.  Although 
the dedicated abolitionist will not recognize the point, social policy cannot 
avoid some form of a cost/benefit analysis.  As the costs go down, as they 
have with the decreasing prospect of erroneous executions and the wringing 
of discrimination out of the system, the argument for maintaining capital 
punishment is strengthened.  It isn’t strengthened enough in our opinion to 
move us from our neutral stance, but that is simply an uninteresting 
biographical observation.  We are not neutral, however, on the level of 
discourse that should inform the decision on capital punishment.  To be 
frank, it has been lamentably low.  We have concentrated here only on one 
                                                                 
24 See, e.g., David Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the 
Legitimacy of Capital Punishment: Reflections on the Interaction of Fact and Perception, 53 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1411 (2004); DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH 
PENALTY : A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990).  The most prevalent finding is that 
when the victim of the murder is black, the likelihood that the offender will receive a capital 
sentence decreases.  Moreover, as will be illustrated below, attempting to eliminate disparate 
impact by applying the same rate of death penalty conviction to black defendants as is 
applied to white defendants would result in more black defendants receiving capital 
sentences: In the 1990 study, Baldus et. al followed 2,484 homicide cases in Georgia 
between 1973 and 1979.  Id.  They found that when a black defendant killed a white victim, 
there was a 21% probability of receiving the death penalty (50 out of 233 cases) whereas in a 
white defendant-black victim case, there was only a 3% (2 out of 60 cases) probability of 
receiving the death penalty.  However, when both the defendant and victim were black, the 
probability of a death sentence decreased to 1% or 18 out of 1443 cases.  In a case where 
both the defendant and the victim were white (58 out of 748 cases), the probability of a 
capital conviction was 8%.  Id. 
  According to the Baldus study, while black defendants who kill white victims face a 
21% chance of receiving the death penalty, black murder defendants face an average 
probability of 3.8% (because 1443 out of the 1676 murders involved black defendants and 
black victims, where the rate of capital conviction is only 1%) (calculated as 
(21%)(233/1676) + (1%)(1443/1676) = (21%)(.14) + (1%)(.86) = 3.8% (average conviction 
rate)).  White defendants in the Baldus study face an average probability of receiving the 
death penalty that is twice as high, or 7.6% (calculated as (8%) (748/808) + (3%)(60/808) = 
(8%)(.92) + (3%)(.074) = 7.6% (average conviction rate)).  An attempt to apply the same 
rate of conviction to black murder defendants as was applied to white defendants would 
consequently result in twice the number of blacks sentenced to death—136 instead of the 
reported 68. 
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side of the debate, because that side is usually underrepresented, but the 
point is a general one.  Bad, ill-informed arguments are so no matter who 
makes them in pursuit of no matter what interest.25  Rhetorically powerful 
but empty arguments are particularly endemic to law school settings with 
their great emphasis on normativity.  Life and death questions deserve 
better than that, which is why we think law schools and legal scholarship 
focus too much on normative questions.  But, we risk now being diverted 
from our focus, which is not law schools and legal scholarship, but the 
death penalty.  To sum up, the death penalty is a complicated problem, just 
like any issue of social planning, of which wrongful convictions is just one 
part of the puzzle. 
 
 
                                                                 
25 As are misleading ones.  For example, the Center on Wrongful convictions 
website posts an "Illinois Death Penalty Fact Sheet" that offers a list of statistics 
that collectively seem to show a racially skewed capital punishment process. For 
example, the fact sheet cites that although only 15.1% of the population is black, 
blacks account for 58.7% of persons sentenced to death.  But there is no 
comparison to how many murders in Illinois are committed by blacks.  Without the 
inclusion of such statistics as a meaningful comparison, it is difficult to know what 
to make of the numbers.  See 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/FactSheet.pdf 
  
The deleterious effect of misleading public discourse can be seen in the June 2, 
2003 editorial of the Chicago Tribune.  Relying on unanalyzed data analogous to 
that posted on the Center's website, the Tribune remarks on the "astonishing 
disparity" in the racial demographics of capital punishment.  Without a minimal 
level of analysis, there is no good reason to believe that the "disparities" are 
"astonishing," and a good deal of reason to believe much, although probably not 
all, of them are explained by legitimate variables. 
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